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Abstract—Game theory is often used as a tool to analyze decen-
tralized systems and their properties, in particular, blockchains.
In this note, we take the opposite view. We argue that blockchains
can and should be used to implement economic mechanisms
because they can help to overcome problems that occur if
trust in the mechanism designer cannot be assumed. Mechanism
design deals with the allocation of resources to agents, often by
extracting private information from them. Some mechanisms are
immune to early information disclosure, while others may heavily
depend on it. Some mechanisms have to randomize to achieve
fairness and efficiency. Both issues, information disclosure, and
randomness require trust in the mechanism designer. If there
is no trust, mechanisms can be manipulated. We claim that
mechanisms that use randomness or sequential information
disclosure are much harder, if not impossible, to audit. Therefore,
centralized implementation is often not a good solution. We
consider some of the most frequently used mechanisms in practice
and identify circumstances under which manipulation is possible.
We propose a decentralized implementation of such mechanisms,
that can be, in practical terms, realized by blockchain technology.
Moreover, we argue in which environments a decentralized
implementation of a mechanism brings a significant advantage.
Index Terms—Mechanism Design, Fairness, Randomness,
Blockchains, Smart Contracts.
I. INTRODUCTION
Most economic mechanisms implicitly assume trust in the
mechanism designer. In this note, we will address two different
trust assumptions that economic mechanisms make and argue
that blockchains and smart contracts can be used to implement
mechanisms even if these assumptions are not met. First, in
most mechanisms, agents submit private information to the
mechanism designer who uses it as an input to decide on
how to allocate goods. However, sometimes, private informa-
tion must be received simultaneously, and goods have to be
allocated instantly. That is, the designer should not provide
any information that he has obtained from some agents to the
remaining agents to put them into an advantageous position.
Consider, for example, auctions. They are used for allocat-
ing or re-allocating goods to agents in numerous applications,
including financial markets (bond sales, initial public or secu-
rity token offerings, opening auctions in stock exchanges), art
and antique markets, procurement, advertisement, wholesale,
etc. Auctions are run since ancient times, but recently more
and more auctions are performed electronically. Therefore,
the use of blockchain technology in auctions has become
relevant1.
In auctions, the auctioneer collects bids for the item at
sale from bidders, allocates the item, and defines payments.
Depending on the auction format (who gets the item and how
1See https://medium.com/crypto-economics/
an-introduction-to-auction-theory-blockchain-edition-cf09b005b1cc
payments are defined), it might be beneficial for some bidders
to learn about other agents’ bids.
Second, some mechanisms use random input bits to decide
on the allocation. It is, therefore, important that the designer
does not manipulate the source of randomness. Consider, for
example, the allocation of school seats to students by lottery.
Lotteries are used to allocate school seats and access to charter
schools in large school districts like Boston, Chicago, or NYC.
In these mechanisms, randomization sometimes happens on a
school level or on a school district level. In some cases, manual
ways are used to generate randomness; in others, computer
software is used.
We identify examples of mechanisms that could bene-
fit from a decentralized implementation. In practical terms,
such implementation can be done using already existing
blockchain infrastructure using smart contracts. Alternatively,
a new blockchain environment can be created to maintain a
decentralized database for the input of the mechanism.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Mechanism Design
Mechanism design is at the intersection of economics and
computer science. It takes an engineering approach to the
design of economic mechanisms and incentives. In many
situations, agents hold private information that is relevant for
determining a welfare-optimizing allocation of resources, or
they take unobserved actions. The mechanism designer creates
or improves economic institutions that incentivize agents to
reveal their private information or to take desirable actions.
Participants in the mechanisms often are assumed to be self-
interested and strategic. The mechanism designer then has to
solve the problem of finding a mechanism that maximizes his
objective (e.g.welfare, revenue, fairness) under participation
and incentive constraints: agents have to be incentivized to par-
ticipate in the mechanism and to reveal relevant information,
respectively, to take optimal actions. Alternatively, mechanism
design can be seen as a form of reverse game theory, where the
mechanism designer designs a game that results in desirable
outcomes. Applications are numerous, spanning economics
and politics (markets, auctions, computational social choice,
monetary policy, insurance, and labor contract design) to
computer science (networks, internet routing, sponsored search
auctions, security).
Game theory proposes different solution concepts that aim
to predict strategic outcomes. A concept that only makes
minimal assumptions on the agents’ strategic sophistication
and ability to predict other agents’ actions is that of a dominant
strategy. Applied to the context of mechanism design, in a
dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) mechanism,
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it is optimal for each player to reveal her private informa-
tion truthfully, no matter what other agents do or report.
However, such mechanisms are rare. Stronger assumptions
on the abilities of agents, lead to solutions concepts such
as Bayesian incentive compatibility (BSIC) that allow for a
wider range of possible mechanisms. However, their analysis
assumes equilibrium play and correct beliefs of agents, and
hence these mechanisms are sensitive to agents’ knowledge
and beliefs about other agents. For a systematic treatment
of mechanism design, see [7] and the references therein.
Recently, tools developed in the mechanism design literature
have been applied in the context of blockchains. See, for
example, [10].
Even if a dominant strategy implementation is possible, we
might worry about the incentives of the mechanism designer.
The mechanism design literature normally ignores the strategic
or malicious motives of the mechanism designer. A recent
contribution [2] is an exception. We will discuss these issues
in more detail later.
B. Blockchains
Blockchain was introduced in [16], as a tool to maintain
the (crypto-)currency Bitcoin. The invention of the blockchain
made it possible to solve the double-spending problem without
the need for a trusted or central authority.
By definition, a blockchain is a growing list of records
collected in blocks, that are linked by using cryptographic
primitives. Each block contains a cryptographic hash of the
previous block, a timestamp, and transaction data, which is
often represented as a Merkle tree.
An important property of a blockchain is that it makes a
modification of the data practically infeasible. To be used
as a distributed ledger, a peer-to-peer network maintains a
blockchain. Participating nodes collectively adhere to a pro-
tocol about node communication and validate new blocks of
such communication. The blockchain is open to everyone in
the network, using a distributed ledger that efficiently records
transactions between two parties, in a verifiable way.
Once recorded, the data in any given block cannot be
changed without alteration of all subsequent blocks, which
normally requires a consensus of the majority of nodes.
Even though blockchain records are, in principle, alterable,
blockchains can still be considered secure. They are an exam-
ple of a distributed computing system with a certain degree of
Byzantine fault tolerance. The decentralized consensus is the
ultimate goal of a blockchain.
Storing the data across a peer-to-peer network eliminates
some risks, in particular, risks that come with a central entity
holding the data. The decentralized blockchain can use the
state of the art message passing and distributed networking
technology. Blockchain security methods include the use of
public-key cryptography. A public key signs every transaction.
The main property of the public key is that only the owner
can sign it. A private key is like a password that gives its
owner access to their digital assets and other functionalities
that blockchains support.
Blockchains use different time-stamping schemes to main-
tain data integrity. The original and still most used such
scheme is proof-of-work. Alternative consensus methods in-
clude proof-of-stake.
Mechanisms can be implemented via smart contracts. A
smart contract, first introduced in [22], is a self-executing
”programmable” protocol, intended to facilitate, verify, and/or
enforce the rules or performance of a contract. Smart contracts
allow the execution of credible transactions without trusted
third parties. Transactions can be tracked, and they are irre-
versible. A blockchain-based smart contract is visible to all
participants of that blockchain.
III. MOTIVATING EXAMPLES
A. Simultaneous Move Games
1) First-Price Auctions: First-price sealed-bid auctions are
frequently used in practice. Agents bid on an item, and the
highest bidder wins the item and pays her bid. This mechanism
can be manipulated by the auctioneer (who acts on behalf of
the seller but whose interests are not aligned with the seller) in
the following way. The auctioneer can tell the highest bidder
the bid of the second-highest bidder, b2. The highest bidder can
send the bid b2+ε, where ε > 0 is some positive number. The
highest bidder claims the item and pays b2+ε. The auctioneer
and the bidder can share the surplus. The seller loses b1−b2−ε
in potential revenue.
First-price auctions are, for example, frequently used for
procurement by the government or businesses. If the govern-
mental official conducting the auction is corrupt, as has been
documented for first-price sealed-bid procurement auctions in
Russia [3], [15], he can extract rents’ by strategically revealing
information, as described above.
2) Second-Price Auctions: Second-price auctions are also
frequently used in practice. Agents bid on an item, and the
highest bidder wins the item and pays the second-highest bid.
This mechanism is the dominant strategy incentive compatible.
However, there is room for manipulation if the information is
not disclosed simultaneously. The auctioneer (whose interests
can now be perfectly aligned with the seller) can, after seeing
the bid from the highest bidder, approach the second-highest
bidder and ask to increase her bid right below the highest
bid. The second highest bidder does not lose anything, while
the auctioneer can share the gains. Mechanisms that can not
be manipulated in this way by the seller are called credible
in [2]. The paper shows that the first-price auction is the
unique credible static mechanism. In particular, the second-
price auction is not credible, as we have outlined above.
Although the first-price auction is credible in this sense, we
have seen in the previous section, that it also suffers from the
possibility of malicious information disclosure, depending on
the context.
3) Generalized Second-Price Auctions: Generalized
second-price auctions are used in practice as well, in
particular for sponsored search. There are n agents and k < n
slots, for each keyword, to be allocated. Each slot i has a
click-through rate, αi. Without loss of generality assume that
αi > αi+1 for any i ≤ k− 1. Denote the bid of agent i by bi
and suppose that bids are sorted.
We distinguish between two cases. In the first, the auction-
eer’s interests are perfectly aligned with the seller of the slots.
Then, he can communicate information to the agent with the
k + 1-highest bid, which does not get a slot. If the agent
increases her bid to bk − ε, she does not get the k-th slot, but
the auctioneer can share the surplus gained from the k-highest
bidder, similarly to the case of the second-price auction.
In the second case, the auctioneer’s interests are not aligned
with the seller of the slots. Then, he can disclose information to
a high bidder about more attractive lower slots. In this case, the
high bidder can deviate by bidding a lower number. Consider
the following examples. There are 2 slots and 3 bidders. The
click-through rates are α1 = 1.0 and α2 = 0.8. Bids are
b1 = 10, b2 = 9 and b3 = 1. If the highest bidder learns about
the lowest bid, she is incentivized to bid between 1 and 9. In
case of truthful revelation, her utility is 10·1.0−9·1.0 = 1.0. In
case of a deviation, her utility becomes 10 ·0.8−1 ·0.8 = 7.2,
an increase of 6.2.
4) Boston School Choice Mechanism: The Boston or Im-
mediate Acceptance Mechanism is a popular method to al-
locate seats in public schools or universities to students.
Students are prioritized according to some criteria, e.g., based
on exam score results, or randomly through a lottery (more on
that later). Students submit a ranking of their most preferred
schools to the mechanism which takes these and the priority
information into account to calculate an assignment: First, the
mechanism tries to assign each student to her first choice.
In the case of over-demand, i.e., if more students have a
particular school as the first choice than seats are available,
then the seats are rationed according to the priorities with the
highest priority students being admitted. Next, the mechanism
tries to assign each student who has not been assigned to her
first choice previously to her second choice. In case of over-
demand, i.e., if more students have a particular school as the
second choice than seats are available (subtracting the seats
already allocated in the first round as well), then the seats are
rationed according to the priorities with the highest priority
students being admitted, and so on. This procedure continues
until all students have been assigned, or no more school seats
remain unfilled.
In general, this procedure is not dominant strategy incentive
compatible: Suppose there are two universities, Oxford and
Cambridge, with one seat to fill each, and three applicants,
Alice, Bob, and Carol. Both Oxford and Cambridge rank Alice
before Bob and Bob before Carol. Suppose both Alice and Bob
prefer Oxford to Cambridge and Carol prefers Cambridge to
Oxford. In the first round of the mechanism, we would try
to match both Alice and Bob to Oxford. However, Oxford
has only one seat available, which is allotted to the better
student, Alice. Carol gets a seat at Cambridge in the first
round, because she is the only applicant who ranks Cambridge
first. In the second round of the mechanism, we will try to
assign Bob to his second choice Cambridge. However, there
is no more seat available at Cambridge, as we have previously
assigned the only seat to Carol.
Now suppose, the university admissions committee sells
the information to Bob that Alice ranks Oxford first, and
Carol ranks Cambridge first. Then Bob can gain from this
information by strategically reporting Cambridge as his first
choice and will obtain a seat at that university.
For more criticism of the mechanism, see [1].
B. Randomness
Randomness is an important ingredient in designing mech-
anisms to allocate public and private goods. Its primary
function is to achieve fairness: Everything else being equal,
if a resource has to be assigned to a person rather than
another person and money cannot be used to compensate, then
randomly allocating that resource is fair from an ex-ante point
of view.
In this note, we want to make the point that the possibility of
implementing random mechanisms with trustworthy random-
ness is actually one of the major advantages of blockchains
and smart contracts and can not be easily substituted by a
centralized mechanism.
Think about the following situations: Public duties or of-
fices have to be assigned. Frequently this is done randomly.
A lottery was used to draft soldiers for the Vietnam war
(There seems to be evidence that the outcome of the 1970
lottery was not entirely random). Jury duties are assigned
randomly. In ancient Athens and Renaissance Florence, public
offices were allocated based on a lottery among eligible
citizens. A lottery assigns green cards in the United States and
working visas in many countries. Recently there have been
proposals for including randomness in democratic decision-
making processes, e.g., random sample voting, [9], assessment
voting [12], some of which have been suggested to be used
in blockchain governance. Finally, proof-of-stake consensus
protocols themselves use randomness to select a subgroup of
participants to perform certain tasks.
Using randomness requires trust. If a central authority
implements randomness, one has to make sure that bribery
does not occur, or that that authority does not manipulate the
process in its favor. On the other hand, verifiable randomness
from a natural source is hard to obtain. Suppose, for example,
that we use the weather as a source of randomness. First of all,
we have to agree on a weather-related event that determines
the outcome. Our choice of such an event depends on our prior
information about, e.g., the likelihood of rainfall tomorrow. If
we hold different information, it is generally hard to agree on a
particular event. [5] famously proved that we could not agree
to disagree even if we hold different information. However,
that presupposes that we are non-strategic, i.e., we dont have
a vested interest and are only concerned with finding the truth.
Suppose we want to implement x if it is raining tomorrow and
y if it is not. What are the times and places where we measure
the rainfall? What is a sufficient amount of precipitation to
declare that it rains? Etc. Suppose we have the same prior
information and have agreed on the definition of rain and a
place where rainfall is measured. Even then, to determine if it
is raining tomorrow, in case of a disagreement, we need a third
party (an oracle) to measure the rainfall. However, then there
might be incentives to bribe that third party. Similar arguments
hold for any predefined source of randomness.
This problem is not only recent or theoretical. Bribing
frequently occurred in the lottery in renaissance Florence,
to the extent that offices were sold rather than randomly
allocated. In the design of proof-of-stake consensus protocols,
it is a mostly unsolved problem to find a reasonable protocol
for determining a token whose holder is eligible to add a block.
The problem of trust is particularly pertinent to lotteries.
Deterministic mechanisms are easy to audit. Even if a central
authority implements the mechanism, we can reproduce all
its steps and make sure that the reported outcome is correct.
Thus in many circumstances, it is not necessary to proceed
in a decentralized way. In lotteries, however, auditing is not
easily possible. Still, we can achieve trust in a distributed way
on a smart contract, as we describe next.
IV. IMPLEMENTATION
We briefly discuss one simple, but robust, way to design a
decentralized random number generator as a smart contract,
in a blockchain environment, e.g., such as Ethereum, [24].
We generate a random number in two phases. In the first
phase, each player i generates her (pseudo) random number
c(i) and then commits to c(i) by sending the hash h(c(i))
to the contract. h should be a cryptographic hash function.
Cryptographic hash functions should satisfy several properties,
of which we detail the most relevant ones to this approach.
First, the same input sequence should always result in the
same output hash. Second, it should be infeasible to generate
a message from its hash (i.e., the hash should not reveal
any information about the input to the hash function). Third,
it should be infeasible to find so-called hash collisions. A
hash collision occurs when two different input sequences are
found, which result in the same hash value. The security of
cryptographic hash functions is typically defined by how well
they resist collision attacks, depending on which input se-
quence the adversary can choose from (any input corresponds
to preimage resistance, a fixed input corresponds to second
preimage resistance). Additional desirable properties are the
following: it is quick to compute the hash value for any given
message, and a small change to a message should change the
hash value extensively. That is, the new hash value should
look uncorrelated with the old hash value. For the references,
see [11], [14], [17], [20], [21].
The first phase ends after a predetermined amount of time T .
In the second phase, each player announces the actual random
number c(i) she has generated, by sending it to the contract.
The contract can check whether the submitted number has
the right hash sent previously: If the hash is not correct, the
contract punishes the player by excluding her from the game.
In the context of allocating goods, the punishment would
preclude her from receiving any good. Assuming that the
hash function h is one-way, no player can change her number
after having committed to it. The second phase ends after
a predetermined amount of time T ′, and then the contract
computes the sum of all available numbers to use it as the
final random number. It is easy to note that with just one of
the players playing honestly, the final output is random, as
desired.
The approach described above turns out to be robust. A
player cannot gain from delaying to uncover her random
number in the second phase. If she waits for other players
to reveal their numbers and does not reveal her number
until T , she does not receive a good. Similarly, corrupting
any strict subset of players does not make a difference. The
algorithm can only be compromised through the collusion of
all participating players. In the latter case, however, we assume
that there is no solution needed in the first place.
Moreover, in contrast to a centralized procedure, it only
requires that one participant does not collude without needing
to know ex-ante who that non-colluding participant is. The
other source of manipulation is on the side of miners. A
miner can manipulate the process by not processing some
players messages in the second phase. For avoiding this type of
manipulation, we should make the second phase long enough
to guarantee that all players will add their initial numbers to
the blockchain. Similar protocols have been implemented in a
blockchain environment, e.g., in Randao2. For a cryptographic
analysis of similar protocols, see [13]. A recent trend in liter-
ature on Verifiable Delay Functions also deals with verifiable
lotteries. However, additional assumptions on the computing
hardware possibilities are required, see [6], [18], [23].
Similarly, players of the mechanism can send hashed private
information to a mechanism, h(pi) and disclose pi, after the
first round. In the context of auctions, pi is the bid of an agent.
In case of school choice mechanisms, pi is the ranking of all
schools for each student, that is the vector (s1, s2, · · · , sn),
where si is the i−th most preferred school. This way, the
mechanism gets all the data from the players in a simultaneous
way, and the disclosure of some information unless the player
wants it, does not take place.
Every agent in this decentralized system can have a copy
of the blockchain. Extensive database replication and compu-
tational trust maintain data quality. No centralized ”official”
copy has to exist, and no user has to be ”trusted” more than
any other.
We suggest that, if the mechanism is simple enough, it
should be implemented as a blockchain itself. For example,
the Boston school choice mechanism and auctions discussed
above fall into a class of simple mechanisms. In the blockchain
implementation, transactions, in this context, messages con-
taining random numbers or private information, can be broad-
cast to the network using the blockchain software. Mining
nodes can validate transactions, add them to the block they
are building, and then broadcast the completed block to other
nodes.
Private or permissioned blockchains can be of particular
interest in our context. Permissioned blockchains have an extra
2See the whitepaper [19].
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Fig. 1. In a centralized implementation (left figure) of a mechanism, the mechanism designer receives a vector of messages M from the agents and a string
of random bits from an external source to generate an allocation. In a decentralized implementation (right figure), agents form a peer-to-peer network, and
each agent i sends a message mi and a random bit ri to a smart contract, which calculates an allocation.
layer for access control. At this layer, the network decides
to give access to a new node. The agents in the game can
be the nodes of the network. Starting node can be a central
authority, that invites/adds all agents to a network. After the
very beginning, the role of a central authority is minimal.
On the other hand, if the mechanism is more involved, for
example, a course scheduling mechanism [8], then it can be
implemented as the smart contract. However, some measures
of precaution have to be taken. For instance, Ethereum based
smart contracts need Gas, a fraction of an Ethereum token,
for the execution. Each operation of a smart contract has
its cost in Gas. Therefore, very complicated mechanisms
might turn out to be too expensive to implement as a smart
contract. [4] presents one example of an economic mechanism
implementation as a smart contract.
V. CONCLUSION
We have argued that implementing economic mechanisms
that allocate goods to agents is a perfect use-case of
blockchains. Mechanisms that use randomness or that are
sensitive to early information disclosure can be implemented
in existing blockchains environments, in the form of smart
contracts, or by creating a new blockchain environment, where
the nodes in the network are the participants of the mechanism.
As we argued, exact implementation details are mechanism
dependent, and we leave them for future research.
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